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This article focuses on the impact of several competing discourses-some local, some global-on higher education (HE) policy formulation in South Africa in the period 1990 to 2002. The article begins by focusing on the key pillars of the new HE policy framework that have been put in place since 1994. The article then goes on to argue that policy is never implemented in any straightforward, linear way. Policy is almost always mediated in the realm of implementation by political (discursive), economic (or structural), and institutional constraints. In the case of HE in South Africa, there has never been a strong consensus in the HE community on the content of the new policy framework, with a high degree of discursive tension and competing interpretations that have characterised the policy debates since 1990. In particular, much of the importation of policy from the international arena into South Africa has clashed with the more localized educational discourses that have evolved historically on both the right and the left of the political centre stage.
Having once acquired state power, the new government was soon constrained by the complexities of governance, particularly the limits imposed on the fiscus by the new macro-economic policy framework, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Department of Finance [DOF], 1996) , which was strongly shaped by international neoliberal thinking and which drastically reduced the new state's abilities to coherently steer and plan the fundamental reconstruction and transformation of HE. Other problems of the social transition have affected the process of policy implementation, such as the poor throughput from schooling and the drop in total HE enrolments in the late 1990s.
This article concludes by examining the final phase in the development of HE policy, including the National Plan on Higher Education (Department of Education [DOE], 2001a) , the report of the National Working Group (NWG) to the minister entitled The Restructuring of the Higher Education System in South Africa (DOE, 2001b) , and finally, the document Transformation and Restructuring: A New Institutional Landscape for Higher Education (Ministry of Education, 2002) , which set out recommendations that were approved by the Cabinet on May 30, 2002. The key focus of these ministerial recommendations and Cabinet decisions had to do with mergers and a reduction in the total number of HE institutions in South Africa. This strong push for increased efficiency has been a key element of HE restructuring across the globe during the past two decades. This article argues that this final phase is best characterised as a period of discursive stalemate. The competing discourses remain, each with some influence, but none dominant.
THE KEY PILLARS OF STATE HE POLICY TODAY
The most influential policy formulation exercise in the HE arena during the 1990s was undoubtedly the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE). The next section will highlight five key pillars of the new HE framework proposed by the NCHE (1996b) and in large part, accepted by the government in the Higher Education Act (1997) and confirmed in the more recent National Plan on Higher Education (DOE, 2001a) .
The five pillars of the new South African HE policy framework are a single nationally coordinated system of HE, increased access and raised participation rates, increased responsiveness to societal and economic needs, programme differentiation and the development of institutional niche areas, and a planning and coordination imperative. Each will now be discussed in more detail.
A Single Nationally Coordinated System of HE
International influences: The shift to an open HE system. The proposal in the new HE policy framework for a "single system" has strong international antecedents. HE systems globally have witnessed dramatic growth in enrolments during the past two decades, particularly amongst traditional students in the fields of recurrent, continuing, and professional education and training-the key access points to HE for the working class and other previously marginalised constituencies.
This expansion and diversity in programme delivery has primarily been an economic response. The globalised knowledge economy has required a more educated and better trained work force, and this has been reflected in the massive expansion of paraprofessional and professional recurrent and continuing education. Technological change is occurring at such a rapid pace that any given state of occupational preparedness can be obsolete within years. This factor, in addition to the increased volume of information and specialist knowledge emerging, heightens the need for lifelong recurrent education.
However, the growth in recurrent and continuing education has also been an educational response, an attempt to improve the learning methodologies available to adult learners. For example, most part-time, recurrent, and continuing education occurs within "open-learning" systems-residential or contact time combined with distance education methods and, in some instances, with the assistance of information technologies. This new open-learning methodology is particularly appealing to the corporate sector who are concerned with the loss of working hours that would be incurred by staff on full-time studies and to adult learners who can study only part-time. Scott (1995) argued that the net result of all of these pressures-both external and internal-has led to a shift from closed to open intellectual systems in the academic arena. This shift entails an epistemological transition away from closed knowledge systems managed only by canonical norms and collegial authority to open systems that are dynamically interactive with outside social interests and knowledge structures. This shift has affected both the teaching (learning) and research functions of HE institutions. First, the increase in enrolments from a wider array of social classes and age groups, with students from a diverse range of life and work experiences, has led to an equivalent shift in the "higher-learning" function of institutions. There has been a move away from the elite cultures and expert knowledges of privileged middle classes (the traditional constituency of elite institutions) to incorporate the values of nonelite communities, particularly the practical competencies required in semiprofessional, professional, and community life. HE institutions are now offering a greater mix of programmes, some based strictly on disciplinary knowledge and canonical norms, others emphasising the development of professional competence in the workplace.
These dramatic developments have had the effect of moving national systems of HE away from binary or divided systems toward more unified single systems with common features and a homogenising mission. Indeed, convergence of this kind is a reality in many national systems as rigid functional distinctions between universities and polytechnics (technikons) are diluted in response to the multiple impacts of massification, globalisation, and institutional creep. However, the erosion of functional differences between previously distinct types at each end of the binary divide does not suggest the rise of uniform missions for all institutions in open systems. Indeed, systemwide dichotomy has given way to institutional-level pluralism and diversity.
Institutions within open HE systems no longer function according to their singular missions of the past. These binary categorisations have become inflexible and incapable of adapting to the increasing pluralism and volatility within the system. Institutions must now respond to a multiple array of complex missions. This occurs largely because of the differentiating effects of the market to which HE institutions must be responsive but also because of the incorporation of diverse subsectors into a single unified HE system. Even within an increasingly unified system, historically acquired diversity is never entirely lost. Rather, these institutions converge within a unified system because their boundaries are now far more permeable than before, enabling partnerships and new institutional configurations across old divides. Institutions must seek their distinctiveness and competitiveness vis-à-vis other institutions, not so much from the old essentialist definitions of institutional type but by customising individualised education and training niche areas in which they wish to excel.
The emergence of Mode 2 knowledge production. A further international influence in the formulation of the new HE policy framework in South Africa has been the emergence of what Scott (1995) and Gibbons et al. (1994) called Mode 2 knowledge-a new mode of knowledge organisation that is taking shape outside of existing academic disciplines (Mode 1 knowledge) and in part, outside the insularity of the traditional university. Scott and Gibbons et al. argued, respectively , that the key feature of this new form of knowledge production is transdisciplinary-which they termed Mode 2 knowledge. It arises at the interstices of existing disciplines and therefore is "generated in the context of application" instead of being developed first and then applied to the context later. As such, Mode 2 knowledge has two additional qualities: It is organisationally diverse and heterogeneous. Organisational diversity arises because Mode 2 is the outcome of teams of knowledge workers with diverse backgrounds who, in most cases, are employed in pursuit of innovation by net-working firms-they include academicians, R&D designers, production engineers, skilled craftspeople, and social scientists.
These two international influences-the shift to a more open system and the emergence of Mode 2 knowledge-provided the conceptual underpinning for the formulation of the key pillars of the new South African HE policy framework. It provided the conceptual legitimation for, first, a strong emphasis on the need for a single system of HE (unlike the racially fragmented and rigid trinary system of the apartheid era) and second, a strong emphasis in the new policy on partnerships and responsiveness in the production of high-skills graduates and in the facilitation of the new mode of knowledge production.
A quick perusal of the key HE policy texts will confirm these influences. The key recommendation of the NCHE (1996b) was that "higher education in South Africa should be conceptualised, planned, governed and funded as a single co-ordinated system" (p. 89). The need for such a proposal arose because of what the NCHE perceived to be an absence of any sense of "system" in South African HE. Three major systemic deficiencies were noted:
• There was a chronic mismatch between HE's output and the needs of a modernising economy.
• There was a strong inclination toward closed-system disciplinary approaches and programmes, which has led to inadequately contextualised teaching and research. The content of the knowledge produced and disseminated was insufficiently responsive to the problems and needs of the African continent, the southern African region, or the vast numbers of poor and rural people in our society.
• There was a lack of regulatory frameworks, due to a long history of organisational and administrative fragmentation and weak accountability. This inhibited planning and coordination, the elimination of duplication and waste, the promotion of better articulation and mobility, and the effective evaluation of quality and efficiency (NCHE, 1996b, p. 2) .
The 1997 White Paper on HE raised similar concerns; it argues that the current system of provision was too fragmented, uncoordinated, supply driven, and insufficiently responsive to national priorities (DOE, 1997, p. 18) . All of the HE policy texts argue that a new regulatory framework is needed that will coordinate the HE band as a single coherent whole, applying uniform norms and procedures with sufficient flexibility to allow for diversity in addressing the multiple needs of highly differentiated learner constituencies.
Increasing Access and Participation Rates
The demand for equity in HE has been a cornerstone in the struggle against apartheid. This demand constitutes the second key pillar of the new HE policy framework. The call for increased access and higher participation rates for Blacks in the HE system is a response to apartheid's inequities in education, as well as a response to globalisation's growing pressure for a more highly skilled future workforce.
The NCHE (1996b) noted these massification imperatives by arguing that the emphasis on increased participation signified a shift away from an HE system that "enrols primarily middle class students into elite professional and scholarly pursuits, to a system characterised by a wider diversity of feeder constituencies and programmes" (p. 76; see also DOE, 1996, pp. 18-19) .
Increased Responsiveness
A third key pillar of the new HE policy framework is the emphasis on increased responsiveness, indicating a shift away from "academic insularity, a closed system governed primarily by the norms and procedures of established disciplines, towards an open HE system which interacts more with its societal environment" (NCHE, 1996b, p. 76) . This new emphasis on responsiveness takes two forms. The first is responsiveness to community needs, which is usually incorporated in the outreach programmes, service learning, and the community-sensitive curricula and research programmes of HE institutions. The second form is socioeconomic-greater responsiveness to the demands of economic growth and technological development. The NCHE (1996b) noted that this new form of responsiveness was leading to dramatic changes within HE, particularly with regard to new forms of knowledge production. Knowledge production has become an "increasingly open system in which a number of actors from different disciplines and from outside HE participate. The value of knowledge is assessed not only on scientific criteria but also on utilitarian and practical grounds" (NCHE, 1996b, pp. 125-126; see also DOE, 1996, p. 35; DOE, 1997, p. 31) .
There is significant evidence of the growth of these new forms of transdisciplinary research and knowledge production in the South African HE system, with more and more applied research and consultancy work seeking solutions to some of South Africa's most acute social and economic problems. The new HE policy framework seeks to encourage this greater responsiveness to community and socioeconomic need.
Programme Differentiation and Institutional "Niche" Areas
Even though the NCHE proposed a single coordinated system with strong homogenising tendencies and central planning imperatives, it was at pains to emphasise the need for ongoing institutional diversity and flexibility regarding boundaries.
The new system, according to the NCHE (1996b), will ensure diversity in terms of institutional missions and programme mixes. This should evolve in "terms of a planned process based on the recognition and pragmatic consideration of current institutional missions and capacities on the one hand, and emerging national and regional needs and priorities on the other" (NCHE, 1996b, p. 167) .
Differentiation of mission in a future system will be based on programmes, not institutional types. In the past, learner mobility was restricted by the rigid boundaries that separated the differing institutional types (colleges, technikons, and universities) and by the terminal qualifications on offer. Diverse course provision was constrained by a bureaucratically managed, unresponsive, and supply-led system of HE provision. In contrast, differentiation within a single nationally coordinated system will be based on institutions developing programme niche areas-centres of excellence-that provide them with a distinct character different than that of neighbouring institutions. This form of differentiation will not be entirely laissez-faire and market driven but will be linked to government human resources development planning and funding strategies and, ultimately, to the needs of the labour market and the country's future economic growth path.
A Particular Approach to State Planning
The fifth pillar of the new policy environment is state steering. State steering relates to the first pillar of the new HE policy framework-the idea of a single nationally coordinated system of HE-because at its heart is a strong emphasis on state coordination. In line with the constitutional notion of cooperative governance, the central state's role is to manage the system in cooperation with other role players and not through prescriptive fiat or other interventionist mechanisms. The state will govern through a "softer" regulatory framework that seeks to steer the system in three important ways: through planning requirements, which will encourage institutions to outline a distinctive mission, mix of programmes, enrolment targets, and overall institutional plan; through the use of financial incentives, which are aimed at encouraging institutions to reorient provision to address national, regional, and local education and training needs and priorities; and through a set of reporting requirements regarding performance indicators dedicated to measure, in the spirit of greater institutional accountability, the extent to which the institutional plan and national priorities are being met. In so doing, these performance indicators are very influential in shaping the allocation of the next cycle of financial awards.
Two types of plan are advocated in the HE policy texts:
A National Higher Education Plan: The NCHE (1996b) argued that a national HE plan is pivotal to the goal of effective coordination in HE. The plan would be developed on a rolling 3-year basis. Its aim would be to establish a programme mix that is "broadly in line with emerging national and regional needs which will require system-wide and institutional planning processes able to co-ordinate the overall shape and size of the system" (NCHE, 1996b, pp. 112, 119) . The first such plan was released in February 2001. Institutional Plans: On the basis of guidelines provided by the national plan, HE institutions would be required to devise 3-year rolling plans that would include institutional mission statements, proposed programmes, indicative targets for enrolment levels by programme, race and gender equity goals, and proposed measures to develop new programme areas (DOE, 1997, p. 19) . Such an institutional plan would be expected to take into account the unique or distinctive mission of the institution, and be informed by student demand, by labour market requirements, by societal equity and development needs and by the new demands of knowledge production in the context of technological innovation and globalisation (DOE, 1998, p. 3).
The final moment in the planning process will be the attainment of approval for institutional plans that will lead to the allocation of funded student places to institutions for approved programmes in particular levels and fields of learning.
This emphasis on planning in the HE policy realm was derived from trends occurring within HE systems internationally. But it was also derived (as will be seen later) from the key political platforms of the African National Congress (ANC) in the early 1990s, one of which was to emphasise the need for an "enabling state." The ANC advocated an enabling state that was "slim" but that could intervene strategically while carefully marshalling its scarce resources. State intervention would be selective and targeted, based on sectoral planning. However, where the state chose to intervene, its intervention would be pervasive and far reaching (Erwin, 1990, p. 38; Gelb, 1991, p. 31) .
POLICY MEDIATION
The previous section outlined the key principles enshrined in the new HE policy framework as evolved since the start of the democratic era in 1990. Much of this new policy regime has not been implemented and, in some instances, has been reinterpreted and adapted. A series of "filtering" and mediation processes have affected policy since its formulation in the early 1990s. This article identifies four layers of filtering and policy mediation:
• policy mediation brought about through the impact of competing ideas and the lack of unanimity on a single "discourse" of change in HE;
• policy adaptation and reinterpretation as a result of the structural limits on power (mainly those that derive from the economy and fiscus);
• institutional limits on change, particularly those to do with the wave upon wave of managerial crises at most HE institutions since 1990; and
• transitional problems peculiar to the current period (but not necessarily indicative of longer term trends), especially those to do with poor student throughput from the school system into the HE system. Student enrolments have, ironically, in this period of democracy and change, been in decline since 1999.
One of the primary difficulties of implementation since 1994 has been the lack of unanimity on the new HE policies. This has been a period of heightened tension brought about by competing ideas regarding how HE should be transformed. Three competing discourses are identified in this article, with each having had significant influence on the process of policy formulation, adaptation, and retraction. Each of these discourses, however, has affected differentially-at certain moments having significant influence, at other times receding. These three discourses can be labelled a high-skills discourse, a popular-democratic discourse, and last, a residual stratification discourse.
The High-Skills Thesis
The process termed globalisation has undoubtedly been the key trigger in the emergence of the high-skills thesis. This is because globalisation poses massive new challenges for the education and training systems of economies across the world-for example, the need for a highly skilled labour force that is able to employ the new technologies and add value to existing goods and services. However, it is not merely specialised skills that are needed; more well-rounded and diverse skill competencies are in demand. Enterprises require entire labour forces that are able to adapt to unpredictable and volatile global product markets and rapid technological change. They require broad problem-solving skills to anticipate flaws in production. It is the ability to retool and respond quickly to rapidly changing market conditions that is highly valued.
In short, globalisation has imposed new conditions on competitiveness that have to do with attaining higher quality manufacture and higher productivity, both on the basis of a more highly skilled workforce. The challenge of attaining these new conditions of economic competitiveness led a group of British economists and educationalists to posit the theory of a low-skills or high-skills equilibrium (see Brown, 1999; Finegold, 1991; Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Keep, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Young, 1992) . It is a "social market" or "social democratic" argument about the necessity for educational reforms to interlock with macroeconomic, industrial, and labour market reforms such that their combined impact has a better chance of meeting the new conditions for global competitiveness-the attainment of high-quality manufacture through a highly skilled and highly productive workforce. The high-skills thesis sees educational reform as constituting one component of a necessarily larger set of socioeconomic reforms. It posits the argument that the attainment of successful reform in one institutional sphere (for example, education) is conditional on parallel changes occurring at other institutional levels (for example, in the macro-economic, labour market, and work organisation environments). Finegold et al. (1990) argued that in countries such as Britain in the early 1990s, the interlocking of particular neoliberal educational and economic policies has produced a low-skills equilibrium. They argued that the network of selfreinforcing institutions and social policies that interact to perpetuate such a lowskill economy include the state and capital's lack of long-term human resources planning; an emphasis on the production of low-cost, low-skill products; the absence of a successful export-oriented, competitive manufacturing strategy; uncoordinated state policies in the spheres of economic growth, industrial policy, and education and training; and finally, a divisive qualifications structure that limits mobility between education and training institutions, thereby hindering the necessary process of continuous skills upgrading. In such a scenario, single reform innovations (such as increased investments in education and training) will not be sufficient to break the self-reinforcing cycle of a low-skills economy. Real change will require a reversal of most of the above conditions to produce a new, self-binding high-skills economy.
The high-skills thesis was very influential in the development of ANC macroeconomic and educational policies in this early period (1990 to 1994). The central propositions of the evolving South African variant of the high-skills thesis were (a) linking education, labour market and macro-economic restructuring within a single, integrated programme of socioeconomic reconstruction; (b) promoting the idea of a "developmental" state to "steer" the implementation of such an integrated programme of complementary reforms; and (c) privileging the idea of a unified and integrative education-and-training regulatory framework.
Linking educational reform with macro-economic and labour market restructuring (1990 to 1994) . The first coherent ANC macro-economic policy framework in the post-1990 period was termed Growth Through Redistribution (ANC, 1990a (ANC, , 1990b Erwin, 1990; Kaplan, 1990; Kaplinsky, 1990) . Drawn up in collaboration with economists aligned to the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), it was the precursor to the more influential Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) . The Growth Through Redistribution doctrine posits the argument that the goals of equity (basic needs provision and redistribution) and economic growth (the increased export of value-added goods) are compatible within a single, comprehensive plan for social reconstruction. The RDP comprises the integration of four key reconstruction programmes: meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy (making it globally competitive), and democratising the state.
The RDP is based on reconstruction and development being parts of an integrated process. This is in contrast to a commonly held view that growth and development, or growth and redistribution, are processes that contradict each other. . . . In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The RDP breaks decisively with this approach. . . . The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme. (ANC, 1994, p. 6) ANC-linked economists argued that this relationship between growth and redistribution constituted a singular process that contrasted sharply with the dualistic approaches of industry and the previous government who both saw growth as a separate and necessary prerequisite for redistributive activities (Gelb, 1991, p. 30) . The ANC's emphasis on a singular process relied heavily on the notion that economic growth was achievable through an extensive and rapid redistribution of wealth, income, and resources (Gelb, 1992, p. 25) .
Occurring in concert with the work done by these ANC economists on the Growth Through Redistribution doctrine, COSATU launched its own programme, the Reconstruction Accord, in March 1993. The Reconstruction Accord was premised on a recognition that new social relations of production between capital and labour were essential for economic renewal. There had been a growing realisation within COSATU that current global restructuring directed toward higher value-added production, a higher science and technology content in production, and export-oriented economies could not be avoided. These global requirements for growth would necessarily have to be achieved through agreements with capital but on terms beneficial to labour (see COSATU, 1993a COSATU, , 1993b Erwin, 1992, p. 23) .
COSATU was also concerned with bolstering state power and promoting a deal between a future ANC government and the organisations of civil society that would commit the state to a programme of "fundamental transformation to the benefit of workers and the poor" (COSATU, 1993b, p. 1). The Reconstruction Accord had five central pillars:
A democratic political solution: The new government must be effective and strong to implement a programme of economic reconstruction and development. Trade unions, through co-determinist structures, would be able to influence state decision making. Education and training for all: There would be an integrated education and training system administered by a single national department and a career-pathing system based on the linkage of workers' skills to pay and grading structures. Unions would be enabled to play a central role in the restructuring of work in areas such as health and safety, new technology, investment, and work organisation. (COSATU, 1993a, pp. 4-7; COSATU, 1993b, p. 5 ).
A programme of job creation. A social wage package to end poverty. A programme to extend socioeconomic rights
Both the Reconstruction Accord and the RDP emphasised the notion of an integrated package of policy reforms linked together in a single coherent plan for social reconstruction. The RDP consciously sought to link economic policy to other policy domains, most particularly employment growth and labour market reform, education and training, human resources development, public works programmes, and youth training schemes (see ANC, 1994, p. 81) .
Two other policy texts in this period emphasised the need to link education reform to macro-economic and labour market reforms in pursuit of a high-skills future for South Africa. These were the National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI) reports Human Resources Development (NEPI, 1992) and the concluding Framework Report (NEPI, 1993) . These documents adopted Finegold's (1991) concept of a low-skills and high-skills equilibrium to compare the former government's education and training policies with those of the incoming ANC government. These reports depicted the former government's proposals for an educational renewal strategy (Department of National Education, 1991 Education, , 1992 and a national training strategy (National Training Board/Human Sciences Research Council, 1991) as reinforcing a "low-participation, low-skills" system. In contrast, the NEPI reports both proposed a high-skills alternative based on a high-skills development path requiring a strong state; a strong civil society; consensual government characterised by vigorous social partnerships between state, capital, and labour; a clear economic growth path; and good-quality basic education and high levels of educational attainment (see NEPI, 1992, pp. 36, 67; 1993, p. 25) .
The developmental state. Another central policy tenet of this time was the ANC's emphasis on the need for an enabling state. The RDP base document noted that "neither a commandist central planning system nor an unfettered free market system can provide adequate solutions to the problems confronting us" (ANC, 1994, p. 78) . Alternatively, the ANC advocated an enabling state that was slim but that could intervene strategically while carefully marshalling its scarce resources. State intervention would be selective and targeted based on sectoral planning. However, where the state chose to intervene, its intervention would be pervasive and far reaching (Erwin, 1990, p. 38; Gelb, 1991, p. 31) . The enabling state would also intervene decisively in the development of an export orientation (as occurred in the successful newly industrialised countries). This would entail the training of highly skilled technicians and engineers, developing a local R&D infrastructure and technological capacity, and targeting specific sectors and industrial clusters for the development of beneficiated products that could compete on world markets (ANC, 1992, p. 66; Kaplan, 1991, pp. 187, 196; Kaplinsky, 1990, p. 24) .
Privileging the idea of a unified and integrative education and training regulatory framework. The high-skills argument worldwide has a political predilection toward the idea of a single, unified, and integrated education and training regulatory framework, primarily as a response to the pressures of globalisation, the massification of the education and training system, and the emergence of new forms of knowledge production. This predilection is reflected in the shift away from the divided, elite education and training systems that characterise the past and present toward the more open and unified education and training system essential in the future (Gibbons et al., 1994; Scott, 1995) .
Adrienne Gail Elliot (1993a, 1993b) , with strong input from British educationalist Michael Young (1992) , were instrumental in developing these ideas further in two discussion documents published by the ANC in 1993. They proposed a "unified, multi-path model" of education and training built on a nationally integrated curriculum with a single qualifications structure. Learners would be required to complete a given number of modules. Some modules would be "core" and compulsory whereas others would be optional and could be selected from a bank of vocational and academic modules. The precise content of these core and optional modules would be determined by the multipath context in which learning was done-whether in the school classroom, the factory training centre, at night school, or by correspondence. The essence of this unified model was its flexibility and credit accumulation properties. These ideas acquired hegemony within the ANC and became official government policy with the publication of the White Paper on Education and Training (DOE, 1995) and the passing of the South African Qualifications Act (1995).
The "Equity" Position: Radical-Progressive and Popular-Democratic Educational Discourses
The second significant discursive development in the 1990s was the consolidation of radical-progressive propositions on educational reform. This discourse derives historically from the People's Education movement of the 1980s, led largely by the National Education Crisis (later Coordinating) Committee. People's Education was primarily a political movement that viewed the school classroom as a central site of struggle against apartheid. However, in the period from 1985 to 1990, it also came to represent a fledgling radical pedagogic alternative to the Bantu Education that had been imposed by the apartheid state since the mid-1950s. Some of the central propositions of People's Education included the development of critical thinking, interdisciplinary curriculum content, learner centredness, participatory teaching methods, community involvement, and the desire to link the focus of formal education with the world of work.
Many of the ideas of People's Education were developed only tentatively by the late 1980s, primarily because of the heavy state repression of National Education Crisis Committee structures during this period, but also because the very concept of People's Education was imprecise and open to multiple interpretations. Further development of these ideas did not take place during the negotiations era. This later period witnessed a widespread abandonment of the egalitarian language of People's Education. In its place arose an expert-led, multistakeholder policy-making process that prioritised other discoursesprimarily the high-skills discourse described above.
Some of the pedagogic concerns of People's Education were subsumed within the adaptation of outcome-based education to South African conditions. Because of outcome-based education's highly technicist and behaviourist origins, its implementation in South Africa after 1995 served to depoliticise the radical pedagogic traditions inherited from People's Education. However, the political concerns associated with People's Education were resurrected within an oppositional discourse on the concept of equity. It represented a call for fundamental social and institutional transformation to eliminate the inequalities imposed by apartheid education. This had a broad appeal among the majority of students, staff, and ex-graduates of the previously disadvantaged (largely Black) institutions. They argued passionately for a radical upgrading and transformation of these institutions to bring them on par with the historically privileged (largely White) institutions. Because of this radical, moral, and political genesis, the discourse is termed popular democratic.
The demands for equity on one hand and the demands of the high-skills discourse on economic development on the other were seen by certain analysts in the education policy debates of the early 1990s to contradict each other. Analysts such as Badat, Barron, Fisher, Pillay, and Wolpe (1994) maintained that equity was not an inevitable consequence of development and that policies for equity did not necessarily lead to development. They argued that international experience had shown that favouring one goal would jeopardise the other. They advocated pursuing the two goals as parallel rather than correlative objectives. They asserted that the tension between equity and development had to be recognised and that for both objectives to be achieved, they needed to be planned for separately.
These discursive tensions-between equity and development-remained throughout the policy-making period from 1990 to 1997. The new state's response was cautious, wishing not to be seen to be privileging one fundamental demand over the other. Following the logic of Badat et al. (1994) , the new state sought to balance these dual imperatives in HE policy:
The South African economy is confronted with the formidable challenge of integrating itself into the competitive arena of international production and finance which has witnessed rapid changes as a result of new communication and information technologies. These technologies, which place a premium on knowledge and skills, leading to the notion of the "knowledge society," have transformed the way in which people work and consume. Simultaneously, the nation is confronted with the challenge of reconstructing domestic social and economic relations to eradicate and redress the inequitable patterns of ownership, wealth and social and economic practices that were shaped by segregation and apartheid. (DOE, 1997, p. 9) The Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education (DOE, 1997) commits itself to a programme of redress. It notes that the Ministry of Education's commitment to changing the composition of the student body would be effected through the targeted redistribution of the public subsidy to HE. It asserts that the relative proportion of public funding used to support academically able but disadvantaged students must be increased. The 1997 White Paper also states that ensuring equity of access must be complemented by a concern for equity of outcomes. Increased access must not lead to a "revolving door" syndrome for students, with high failure and drop-out rates. In this respect, the ministry is "committed to ensuring that public funds earmarked for achieving redress and equity must be linked to measurable progress toward improving quality and reducing the high dropout and repetition rates" (DOE, 1997, p. 22) .
A Residual Discourse of the Old Order: Stratification Thinking
The final discursive influence on HE policy during the past decade is that of stratification thinking. This is a residual discourse-a contemporary expression of a much older discourse that has strong roots in the education policies of the previous government. The most definitive influence in shaping this discourse historically was the adoption in 1974 of a trinary system of HE in South Africa by the Van Wyk De Vries Commission (1973) .
The trinary model proposed by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission (1973) maintained that universities should concentrate on the teaching and research of the basic fundamental principles of science, that technikons should concentrate on the application of scientific principles to practical problems and on technology, and that colleges should provide vocational training (Department of National Education, 1995, p. 10). This fairly rigid differentiation of function between institutions has been maintained to this day.
Even though the trinary divide is still in place, dissatisfaction with some of its key tenets has been surfacing for some time, even during the old order. In a 1995 report, the state acknowledged that the present system was to a large extent characterised by rigidity and inflexibility, with each sub-sector and institution largely working in isolation. This situation was not only inhibiting as regards the articulation of learners, but at the same time it hampered the essential exchange of expertise. (Department of National Education, 1995) The report continued to argue that the trinary divide was problematic because universities were also involved in professional or career training, that technology was increasingly more dependent on links between disciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledge, and that the technikons had in any event moved well beyond their "application of technology" mandate by offering courses in business, commerce, and the social sciences and by acquiring the right in 1993 to offer degree programmes (Department of National Education, 1995, pp. 12, 19; Technikons Act, 1993 ; see also Committee of Technikon Principals [CTP], 1995, p. 5).
The continued articulation of a discourse on stratification. This fairly rigid differentiation of function between institutions has been maintained to this day, and support for stratification thinking was never entirely displaced from the domain of educational policy discourse, including the policy formulation processes led by the new government from 1994 onward. For example, the interim Discussion Document of the NCHE (1996a), released in April, elaborates on the divisions between supporters of functional and flexible differentiation. It reports that elements within the technikon sector made submissions that argued strongly for the retention and rein-forcement of the technikons as a distinct sector with a unique mission within HE (functional differentiation). The case of the technikons'support for functional differentiation rested heavily on the need to ensure an appropriate mix of graduates and diplomats to meet South Africa's broad human resource needs. The view that the current mix is skewed in favour of university graduates, and the proposition that "career education" is best ensured and protected within an HE sector dedicated to this purpose, have been put forward. The argument is for the retention of functional differentiation with an altered balance to enhance the technikon's role. . . . Technikons would have a delineated function in the offering of career and vocational education (incorporating experiential learning, and via programmes designed in conjunction with the relevant "employers" grouping) and in development and product-related research. Universities, in contrast, would focus on general formative education, intellectual preparation for professions, and basic and applied research. This broad functional differentiation would determine the location of new programmes linked to emerging needs, and there would be a phased orderly reassignment of existing programmes mislocated in terms of these broad criteria where this is required. In practice, this would mean universities and technikons taking responsibility for different programme types and levels on the single qualifications framework. (NCHE, 1996a, p. 55) Under flexible differentiation, in contrast, differentiation would occur in terms of institutional missions and programme mixes. It would evolve in terms of a planned process based on emerging national and regional needs and not the inherited sectoral location of the institution (NCHE, 1996a, pp. 56-57) .
The final report of the NCHE (1996b) fudged these differences by adopting the middle-ground position referred to above. The NCHE resolution reads, The Commission's task is not to propose a unified, binary or stratified institutional structure for the single co-ordinated system, but to recommend a set of transitional arrangements that will hold while national and regional needs are clarified, planning capacities are developed and institutional development proceeds. The Commission believes that the system should recognise, in name and in broad function and mission, the existence of universities, technikons and colleges as types of institutions offering HE programmes. But these institutional types should not be regarded as discrete sectors with mutually exclusive missions and programme offerings. The new system will evolve through a planned process which recognises current institutional missions and capacities, addresses the distortions created by apartheid, and responds to emerging regional and national needs. At a later stage in this evolution, it may be decided whether the new system should retain the distinction between universities, technikons and colleges, change the nature of the distinction, and increase or decrease the number of institutional types. (pp. 15-16) The NCHE saw its proposal for a single coordinated system of HE as occupying the middle ground in an often-heated contestation over differentiation. In this formulation, the concerns of those supporting functional differentiation could be reconciled with the arguments for greater flexibility. The NCHE conceived of its proposal as pragmatic, providing a continuum along which the system could gradually move, from "functional differentiation" toward a truly single system with softened boundaries (NCHE, 1996b, p. 283) .
Nonetheless, the dissenting voice remained. In the final 1996 report of the NCHE, Brian Figaji, rector of Peninsula Technikon, published a minority report that expressed opposition to Colleges of Further Education encroaching onto HE turf by offering career and vocational education at the HE level (NCHE, 1996b) . More significant, Figaji also opposed the notion of differentiation being based on programme rather than institution. His view was that if any institution could offer any programme, it would "negate the current institutional missions and educational cultures" of existing institutions such as technikons: "The result of this scheme is going to be 'academic creep' at an unprecedented scale with vocational and career education once again sidelined in favour of the higher status 'academic' programmes" (NCHE, 1996b, p. 318).
Figaji has since led the call for opposition to the notion of programme differentiation. In a 1999 lecture, he warned against the dangers of a policy framework that inevitably would push institutions towards convergence and homogeneity-exactly the opposite of the differentiation desired by policy. In his speech, he again repeated the case for a "higher education system with different institutional types such as colleges, universities and technikons, each with its own distinct mission and programme" (Figaji, 1999, p. 15) .
The proposals of the Council on Higher Education (CHE).
The launch of the Size and Shape Task Team of the CHE was a response to a July 1999 call by the new minister of education, Professor Kader Asmal, for the review and reform of the institutional landscape of HE. The Task Team was set up in January 2000. It published a draft discussion document in April (CHE, 2000a) and a final report in July (CHE, 2000b) that articulate a distinct set of recommendations to the minister regarding the reconfiguration of the HE institutional landscape.
The point of departure for the Task Team was the existing HE policy framework. However, the Task Team argued that this framework on its own was not sufficient. Events since the passing of the Higher Education Act (1997) necessitated a rethink on certain issues. The Task Team argued that although the HE White Paper (DOE, 1997) provided a powerful and robust framework for the transformation of HE, it did not and could not anticipate a number of conditions and developments that had since emerged. These included
• institutional responses that exacerbated the inherited fragmentation and incoherence of the system and the inefficient and ineffective utilisation of resources;
• competition between public institutions on programme offerings and student enrolments that overshadowed cooperation and led toward homogeneity and sameness in an environment of declining enrolments;
• weaknesses and capacity problems in national and institutional planning processes that in the short term compromised the efficacy of these instruments to steer and regulate HE;
• inadequate senior-and middle-level management capacities within the system; • the diversification of funding and sources of revenue and the extent to which state funding had become an increasingly limited instrument for steering and regulation of HE;
• the decline in students with matriculation exemptions; and • the lack of adequate regulation of private HE that could have adverse consequences for a vibrant public HE sector (CHE, 2000b, pp. 33-34) .
These conditions, the Task Team reported, threatened important policy goals and required an immediate response. South African HE could not continue to function on the basis of an inefficient, fragmented, and unplanned set of institutional roles.
The recommendations on differentiation. The recommendations made by the Task Team were controversial and to a large extent in conflict with the essence of the new HE policy framework. At the heart of the Task Team proposal was the promotion of a highly diversified HE system premised on institutional differentiation rather than programme differentiation as advocated in all of the previous policy texts. The Task Team report (CHE, 2000a) proposed a new three-tiered institutional landscape. The three institutional types were defined primarily by prescriptions imposed on their core teaching and research functions:
A bedrock HE institution was defined as a dedicated undergraduate teaching institution with limitations imposed on the extent and spread of its postgraduate and research programmes. Its key function was to provide high-quality undergraduate teaching to a wide constituency of learners. A comprehensive institution was defined as having significant postgraduate and research capabilities, with its primary function being the production of new scientific knowledge and the training of the country's future cadre of high-skills graduates. An extensive master's and limited doctoral institution was defined as an in-between institutional structure with greater resources available than the bedrock campuses, that could offer extensive master's programmes, but with similar limitations to those applicable to the bedrocks in relation to doctoral programmes and knowledge production functions (research).
Support and opposition for the CHE proposals. Support for the CHE's threetiered model did emerge, unsurprisingly, from the technikon sector. This sector, particularly through its mouthpiece organisation, the CTP, was notably enthusiastic about the key components of the CHE proposals. In its formal response to the CHE (2000b) report, the CTP gave the key proposals its full support. The CTP (2000) fully supported the stance of the CHE on differentiation "because it would facilitate more effective responses from institutions to the various social needs of the country" (p. 2).
The CHE recommendations, as could be expected, also triggered strong opposition from key stakeholders in HE, particularly from the South African Universities Vice-Chancellors Association (formerly the Committee of University Principals), which argued,
The core three-tier institutional typology is conceptually problematic as it establishes artificial dichotomies between research and teaching as well as between undergraduate and post-graduate provision. Further, it introduces pre-determined, unhelpful grading and ranking of institutions within imposed status-bound hierarchies which will be viewed negatively by employers, staff and students. It will further entrench the infamous South African HAI/HDI [historically advantaged institution/historically disadvantaged institution] discourse . . . [and] destroy the pockets of research developed to date which will in turn depress the culture of scholarship in the "bedrocks" and trap [staff] in de-motivating environments. (Kotecha, 2000, pp. 1, 5) The South African Universities Vice-Chancellors Association's opposition to the proposals was essentially twofold. First, there was concern that the three-tiered system would simply replicate the racial differentiation imposed by apartheid education. Second, the proposals were seen as a reversal in policy orientation, away from the single coordinated system emphasised in earlier policy texts and toward a classical social stratification model of provision.
The Effects of Competing DiscoursesPolicy Slippage and Ambiguity
The preceding sections have made the argument that there have been (and currently still are) three competing policy discourses-global and local-that have made unanimity and certainty on official government policy on HE difficult. At different historical moments, these highly divergent discourses have had varying influence. For example, the high-skills argument, although central to ANC education and economic thinking, never acquired the position of orthodoxy needed for its successful implementation. This was in part a consequence of the wide opposition from many commentators who positioned themselves against the form of renewed capitalism it represented. Left-wing critics such as Wolpe (1994) opposed much of what he saw (pejoratively) in the high-skills thesis as an economic rationalist discourse because it privileged the renewal of a new form of capitalist exploitation-globalisation. However, Wolpe and others who opposed the high-skills thesis weakened its appeal without providing an alternative theorisation of the education-economy nexus.
This failure to privilege the high-skills route not only was the failing of the policy formulation process or of the DOE but also was compounded by the glaring absence of a coherent set of economic growth, industrial, and human resources development policies that would have given support to the high-skills imperative.
Underpinning all of this policy slippage was the significant shift in macroeconomic policy from the social democratic platforms of the Reconstruction Accord, Growth Through Redistribution doctrine, and the RDP (ANC, 1994) to the more conservative monetary policies of GEAR (DOF, 1996) . Ironically, this shift confirms the scepticism of Left critics who have questioned the political orientation of the high-skills thesis. The regularity of the accusation that a neoliberal economic rationalism underpinned much of the HE policy framework rose sharply in the wake of the demise of the high-skills thesis after GEAR's launch in June 1996.
Likewise, according to its proponents, popular-democratic discourse was not satisfactorily incorporated within policy. Under the persuasive call for reconciliation and compromise-key elements of the political settlement forged in 1994-the new state had in essence signed away the possibility of strong redistributive action to redress the institutional inequalities created by apartheid. Expressions of equity and redress in the policy and legislation were, as a consequence of the political settlement, merely ameliorative and not substantive. In response, popular-democratic discourse formed the basis of an emerging oppositional movement to the ANC government's new policies on HE. The equity and redress voice outside of the official policy arena grew stronger and more strident in the period under review as one after another of the historically disadvantaged institutions succumbed to crisis, driven mainly by growing institutional debt, mismanagement, poor leadership, and ongoing staff and student protest. This dissident discourse-vocally articulated by the vice-chancellors and deputy vice-chancellors of most historically disadvantaged institutionsargued that many of the problems experienced by historically disadvantaged institutions after 1994 were due to the absence of any substantive programme of radical redress for these institutions.
The final outcome of this interplay between discursive tension and state incapacity in HE has taken three forms: (a) There was no explicit pursuit of a major programme of institutional redress-fiscal constraint and conservative macroeconomic policy disallowed this; (b) there was no explicit pursuit of the highskills route that was predicated on a massified and unskilled workforce-fiscal constraint, the dramatic decline in HE enrolments, and a lack of consensus over the validity of the high-skills route disallowed this; and (c) the new state did not use any of its envisaged planning and coordination levers-lack of capacity disallowed this.
Lurking behind the imminent demise of both the high-skills and populardemocratic discourses lay the residual arguments from the old order about the utility of stratification in resolving educational problems in postsecondary education and training. The consequence of all of this discursive conflict was that there was no strong binding consensus forged across all HE constituencies in support of the official policy enacted by the new government. It was a period characterised by a lack of policy adhesion.
THE STRUCTURAL LIMITS ON IMPLEMENTATION

Fiscal Restraint and a Shift in Macro-Economic Policy
Orthodox international macro-economic policy has also been very influential in the policy formulation process in South Africa. One of the most significant and earliest shifts in ANC policy occurred in June 1996 with the release of the GEAR (DOF, 1996) strategy as the government's official macro-economic dogma, displacing the RDP (ANC, 1994) from its earlier status as the party's social democratic orthodoxy on economic policy. The significance of GEAR was that it privileged the attainment of monetary policy objectives such as the reduction of the state's fiscal deficit and inflation rate at the expense of other important features of the RDP's broad socioeconomic platform of policiesparticularly those elements in the RDP and Growth Through Redistribution doctrine that were premised on coordinated market policies, a developmental state, and the provision of basic needs. Work by Webster and Adler (1999) highlighted the genesis of this shift from what the authors termed the "Left-Keynesian" framework of the Growth Through Redistribution doctrine and the RDP to the conservative macro-economics of GEAR. The roots of this shift lay as far back as November 1993 with the formation of the Transitional Executive Council when ANC officials, along with representatives from the apartheid government's DOF and Reserve Bank, negotiated a secret deal with the World Bank to secure a U.S.$850 million loan. In return, the ANC (as the future government) agreed to maintain existing monetary policy, prioritise inflation reduction, contain government expenditure, and desist from raising taxes-the key premises of the future GEAR strategy. Webster and Adler (p. 15) showed how these two tendencies-Left-Keynesianism and macro-economic conservatism-ran par-allel to each other from 1993 onwards, but with the latter having a significant influence over the former. For example, the initial COSATU Reconstruction Accord was redrafted by the ANC in its preparation of the April 1994 RDP election manifesto to include strong references to the new monetarist principles. By June 1996, with the publication of GEAR, this conservative macro-economic framework was the new ANC economic orthodoxy, having effectively neutralised COSATU and Communist Party opposition to these shifts.
The impact of GEAR (DOF, 1996) on the policy debates in the HE sector was also severe. Along with the 1997 publication of the government's Medium Term Expenditure Framework, which laid out the government's intended expenditure patterns and priorities over a 3-year period (for a fuller discussion of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, see DOF, 1996; National Treasury, 2002) , the impact of these tight fiscal policies meant that the HE sector was unlikely to be allocated more financial resources than before. Total education expenditure has stabilised at about 21.3% of total government expenditure. HE has consumed 14% of this allocation (Cloete & Bunting, 2000, p. 66) . These percentages are very favourable in comparative terms. Exceeding them would be extremely difficult for the government to afford or justify.
These limits on state intervention filtered through to HE even during the policy formulation phase. Perhaps the most contrasting feature between the White Paper (DOE, 1997) and the report of the NCHE (1996b) was the former document's fiscal realism:
What is not clear, however, is what increases in participation rates for black students, and overall, are possible within the foreseeable future in the context of the government's macro-economic framework and fiscal policies. . . . It is unlikely that the recent trend of public expenditure growth rates in this sector can be sustained over the next decade, given other pressing social needs. . . . Despite national fiscal constraints, and the government's commitment to fiscal discipline, the central role of higher education in developing high-level skills and competencies essential for social and economic development requires sustained financial investment in the higher education system. Substantial additional costs are associated with greater student participation, redress of current inequities, and the restructuring of existing programmes. These costs will have to be met from a strategic mix of funding sources. These will include system and institutional efficiencies, a greater volume of private contributions, and increased, redistributed and tightly targeted public sector outlays. (DOE, 1997, pp. 21, 45-46) A significant shift in focus has therefore occurred-already present in the policymaking period of 1997 but amplified later-that HE transformation could be brought about only through the attainment of greater institutional efficiencies and cost-effectiveness and the redistribution of these savings to targeted transformational interventions. However, as Cloete and Bunting (2000, p. 64) pointed out, the state has failed to increase the amount allocated to redress through earmarked funding in the 1995 to 1999 period and is therefore unlikely to be able to afford a dramatic increase in the near future. The subsidy block grants to institutions still dominate about 88% of government allocations, whereas the level for earmarked funding has remained relatively stable since 1995 at 12%. In short, fiscal restraint-and lower economic growth rates than initially forecast by GEAR (DOF, 1996)-seriously constrained the government's ability to act positively in terms of redressing the inequities inherited by the HE system from the past.
Institutional Limits: A Weak HE Sector
The role accorded the state has changed considerably since the transfer of power to the ANC in April 1994. Prior to this watershed moment, the dominant view of the state within ANC ranks was that it should be a developmental state, making strategic interventions to overcome the limits of the market in steering economic and social development in directions consistent with socioeconomic priorities.
However, the actual experience of state power has been somewhat different. Capacity problems are perhaps the most limiting factor of the new state. Young and inexperienced "new guard" cadres entered the state alongside remnants of the "old guard" without sufficient transfer of the tacit knowledge about state governance from the old to the new. In addition, sufficient policy "adhesion" has not occurred satisfactorily within the state apparatus. Significant levels of policy doubt exist, particularly with regard to certain policy platforms such as an integrated education and training system, the incorporation of senior secondary schools within the Further Education Training band, HE's incorporation within the National Qualifications Framework and the South African Qualifications Authority, and a single, national, and coordinated HE system. These have not acquired the full support of the civil service.
Two other structural features have limited the power of the state. First, the old apparatuses of the state have remained largely unchanged. For example, the Departments of Education and of Labour were not integrated as expected from the policy texts. This decision has had serious ramifications, most important the failure of the new state to discard the political fiefdoms and territorial modes of working that characterised the divide between "education" and "training" in the apartheid state. In addition, few meaningful linkages have been established between education, the key economic departments (the Department of Trade and Industry, for example), and the science department (the Department of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology). These divisions within the state continue and seriously hinder the development of a comprehensive and well-coordinated human resource development strategy for the country. They weaken the possibilities for attaining "coordinated social market" policies founded on the idea of a developmental state-the short-lived RDP (ANC, 1994) being the best example of failed cross-sectoral attempts at policy coordination.
Last, state power has been considerably weakened by the dissolution and incorporation of the Bantustan and homeland regimes into the central state alongside the simultaneous devolution of power to nine provinces. The first process acted to incorporate an inefficient, bureaucratic, and often corrupt Bantustan and homeland civil service within the new central state. The latter process acted to devolve the powers of the developmental state to nine provinces, two of which are governed by opposition parties less committed to official education and training policies.
In short, all of these factors have acted to limit the state's ability to act decisively across all social policy domains, including education and HE.
Unexpected Problems in the Transition Phase: Student Enrolment Flux
The transition to the postapartheid era has had a wide array of problemssome expected and others unexpected-that have occurred as a result of the difficulties of moving from the old to the new order. A number of unexpected developments have had a negative effect on the HE system. First, there has been a wide fluctuation in enrolment patterns as a result of unpredicted student choice enrolment behaviour. Students now have a far wider variety of both public and private institutions open to students of all races and languages. Institutions that previously did not enrol large numbers of African students but that are now successfully doing so are the formerly White Afrikaner institutions and the technikon sector-both of which have received significant increases in African enrolment since the late 1990s. Together with an emerging private HE system, these institutions have succeeded in poaching African students away from the historically disadvantaged institutions.
Second, student enrolments have fallen dramatically during the past 5 yearsfrom a high of 605,000 in 1996 to a low of 564,000 in 1999. Reasons provided for this decline include the high cost of tuition fees, the dramatic drop in the number of matriculants with university exemption certificates, the perceived decline in the quality of public HE, and the consequent growth in private and international HE in South Africa (see Cloete & Bunting, 2000) .
All of these market factors-responsiveness, enhanced student choice, and declining enrolments-have combined to create dramatic shifts in the institu-tional landscape of HE. The changes have also had an uneven impact, triggering expansionary and contractionary effects across the system. For example, enrolments increased by 36,000 during 1995 to 1999 at the historically White and Afrikaans-speaking universities whilst dropping in the same period by 22,000 students at the historically disadvantaged Black universities (Cloete & Bunting, 2000, p. 23) .
THE FINAL PHASE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN HE
A final phase in the development of new HE policy in South Africa was reached in the period from 2001 to 2002. Much of this finality was forged on the instrument of institutional mergers-a move followed by governments elsewhere in the world during the past two decades. This final phase began with the February 2001 release of the National Plan for Higher Education (Ministry of Education, 2001) . Its main purpose was, first, in the face of the growing policy doubt triggered by the stratification proposals of the CHE, to reaffirm all of the key policy principles mentioned above and second (and perhaps more important), to set the terms of policy in regard to two issues not adequately dealt with in previous policy and legislation: institutional differentiation within a single system and institutional efficiency. The next section will briefly examine these two issues.
Addressing Institutional Differentiation
The National Plan firmly rejected the rigid structural differentiation of the CHE report, although it added a new element in the ongoing policy debate about institutional differentiation. It proposed the retention of the binary divide between technikons and universities for a period of at least 5 years, primarily to limit the extent of institutional creep and the drift toward programme uniformity (DOE, 2001a, pp. 1, 14-15) .
The tendency toward uniformity of provision, according to the National Plan, "is worrying." There has been little evidence of attempts by institutions, it argues, to identify unique institutional strengths and niche areas, either existing or potential, that would differentiate between institutions:
In fact, other than the broad distinction between universities and technikons in terms of the career-oriented and technological focus of the latter, there is little else to distinguish between and within the aspirations of the university and technikon sectors. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that many institutions aspire to a common "gold" stan-dard as represented by the major research institutions, both nationally and internationally. (DOE, 2001a, p. 50) The National Plan identified three determinants of the tendency toward uniformity. These were the absence of planning capacity at institutional level to identify unique niche areas, the lack of a strong regulatory framework designed to ensure diversity, and the highly competitive and imitative behaviour of institutions as witnessed in the past decade (DOE, 2001a, p. 51) .
The solutions to these problems do not lie with the CHE's proposed rigid system of structural differentiation, "which introduces an element of rigidity which will preclude institutions from building on their strengths to respond to social and economic needs" in unique and differing ways (DOE, 2001a, p. 54) . The solution (according to the National Plan) lies in a return to mission and programme differentiation as outlined in the DOE's (1997) White Paper that would allow institutions to define a unique developmental and programme trajectory for themselves in a way that would not "lock them into a predetermined institutional structure" as would be the case with the CHE proposals (DOE, 2001a, p. 54) . The tendency toward uniformity will be restricted by levers, sanctions, and incentives built into the "planning grid" proposed by the National Plan that would limit provision in areas that were duplicative or inefficient in the use of scarce resources.
Addressing Efficiency: Mergers
In contrast to its rejection of much of the CHE proposals on institutional differentiation, the National Plan clearly signals its support for the CHE analysis and recommendations regarding improving system efficiency and effectiveness. The National Plan argues that the key point to emphasise is that the rationale for restructuring the higher education system is to ensure the fitness of purpose both of the system and of the individual institutions. The fact is the higher education system is currently not operating efficiently in terms of its core mandate, i.e. the production of knowledge and graduates. In this context, the starting point for restructuring the higher education system must be to ensure that higher education institutions, as they are structured, become more efficient and effective, before embarking on new roles and functions. (DOE, 2001a, p. 59) The National Plan specifically agrees with the CHE's analysis that the "sustainability and transformation of the higher education system requires a reduction in the number of institutions" (DOE, 2001a, p. 86) . It agrees with the reasons given by the CHE for a reduction in the number of institutions, the key arguments being the sec-tor's roots in a tainted apartheid past, its lack of responsiveness to human resources development needs, and the lack of capacity to manage the current configuration of institutions.
The National Plan is very assertive on the question of state steering, coordination, and planning, reflecting a clear return to the language of the NCHE (1996b) report and White Paper (DOE, 1997) . It is strongly critical of the lack of real collaboration and the high degree of institutional self-interest and voluntarism that has characterised the sector's response to the new policy environment since the mid-1990s:
Institutional collaboration will not make any headway unless there is direct intervention and stronger signals from government. . . . The Minister does not agree with suggestions from the higher education sector that combination processes should be essentially self-driven, although within a stronger policy framework. Voluntarism . . . has failed to encourage institutional collaboration. And while planning and funding mechanisms will play an important role in steering programme and infrastructural collaboration, they are insufficient on their own to alter the institutional landscape of higher education. The Ministry firmly believes that if the institutional landscape of higher education is to be restructured, the Minister will have to exercise the full regulatory powers at his disposal in terms of the Higher Education Act (No 101 of 1997) , that is, the power to merge two or more public higher education institutions into a single institution. The Ministry will not shy away from this responsibility. (DOE, 2001a, pp. 81, 86) The strength of the National Plan undoubtedly lies with its return to the idea of state steerage. The National Plan has a strongly articulated commitment to implement policy and in particular to implement the levers, sanctions, and incentives that will steer the entire system in the direction of a diverse yet single coordinated national system of HE. The document asserts strongly that the framework outlined "is not open for further consultation. The focus must now be firmly on implementation" (DOE, 2001a, p. 13) . The DOE has never before spoken with such resolution regarding HE policy.
Binary divide:
The NWG supported the continuation of the binary divide between universities and technikons. Comprehensive institutions: The NWG proposed a new institutional type to be termed a comprehensive institution that would arise out of the merger of a university and a technikon. The NWG warned that "great care should be exercised in these situations to prevent academic drift" (p. 50). The benefits of comprehensives would be increased access, with students able to choose from a wider array of career-focused and academic programmes; improved articulation between career-focused and academic programmes; the strengthening and development of applied research; and enhanced capacity to respond to the socioeconomic needs of neighbouring regions given the wider range of expertise available after institutional mergers (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 27 ).
The NWG (DOE, 2001b) proposed an entirely new institutional landscape comprising four differing types: universities, technikons, comprehensives, and provincially based national institutes of HE. The NWG proposals were received with significant hostility by a threatened HE leadership who for the first time realized the closeness of the imminent changes. The minister, however, did not back down in the face of this opposition and with minor amendments, the minister and Cabinet accepted much of the NWG logic and its recommendations. Table 1 summarises the final decisions of the minister regarding the new institutional landscape. As can be seen, the new HE system will comprise 23 institutions in all-significantly down from the current 35.
Interrogating Comprehensive Institutions
The NWG (DOE, 2001b) proposals regarding comprehensives require further interrogation. The proposals, made by the NWG and accepted by the minister, shift the axis of differentiation away from an elite social stratification model (research institutions vs. bedrock teaching institutions), as proposed by the CHE, to a model based on the traditional academic/vocational divide (universities engaged in teaching and research, technikons engaged in career-oriented vocational education, and comprehensives doing a mixture of both).
As a consequence of this shift, the political opposition to differentiation has been less severe than the protests against the CHE's socially divisive recommendations. Much of the attention after the release of the NWG reports and the Cabinet decision has been about mergers. Institutional responses have been largely self-interested and defensive-the last stands against inevitable institutional change.
However, the new basis for differentiation is problematic because it reinforces the binary divide in two almost contradictory institutional forms. In the one instance, the academic and career-oriented teaching programmes need to be undertaken in two distinct institutional forms (universities and technikons); but in the other instance, they can be undertaken in the same institutional form (comprehensive). The NWG and ministerial response provide no insight as to how these differing roles can be played out both in a dual and a single institutional context. The proposals also contradict the new wisdom internationally regarding binary systems-that they have become increasingly obsolete in the face of new forms of knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994; Scott, 1995) . The comprehensive model plus the decision to retain the binary divide remains incomprehensible in its current form. The government should rather be seeking to shift all institutions toward a single system from which particular institutions can choose a unique mission and niche. This would entail a choice of programme offerings that would feed off an environment of high-level research and the production of postgraduate students who could serve as today's tutors and tomorrow's lecturers and researchers. A wide spectrum of programmes would be on offer, some primarily academic and discipline based, others vocational and interdisciplinary. This is how most successful universities function in the world. However, most historically disadvantaged universities, most technikons, and the proposed comprehensives will not live up to these requirements. In the absence of such a developmental strategy, the current proposals are likely to solidify current institutional inequalities derived from both the old binary divide and apartheid discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Some finality has been achieved in the decisions of the minister and Cabinet to restructure HE through the instrument of mergers and comprehensives. It suggests that the discourse of stratification has been accommodated within the state to a greater extent than the other contending voices-popular-democratic and economic-rationalist voices. Much of the current opposition to the minister's plans has more to do with the accusation that the merger plans will lead to the demise of historically disadvantaged institutions and the silencing of the "Black" voice than to any objection to the continuance of the binary divide and the introduction of comprehensives.
The ministerial proposals do of course take on board some of the high-skills discourse because firstly, the state has taken on a strong steering role and second, much of the restructuring is motivated by the need to create an efficient system that is more responsive to the social and economic needs of the country than is currently the case.
As a result, the present period can be characterized as a phase of discursive stalemate-ending a long period of policy contestation. The key competing dis-courses remain, each with some influence, but none dominant. The implementation of the mergers during the next 5 to 10 years will be a crucial period. If mergers are successful, the discourses of social stratification and differentiation will be triumphant, but if disastrous, there will be strong rearguard action against state policies that will make more effective use of radical popular-democratic discourse than has been the case in the past. And if HE has not improved its contribution to the stimulation of economic growth, there will be stronger pressure in this regard. The jury is still out on all of these possibilities.
